There is a famous saying, “those who do not study history is doomed to repeat it.”
It may be more precise to say those who do not study history fail to learn from it. The intent is essentially the same, but with a different twist. A similar saying is “there is nothing new under the sun.”
Whatever you may be planning, it has been done before. Sometimes successfully, sometimes the undertaking was a dismal failure. Either way, there are lessons to be learned from the experience of others.
The Castle Doctrine and this page in particular isn’t intended to teach tactics. The real intent is a little deeper. For those who are interested, this page is intended to make one think.
General George S. Patton famously stated, “Compared to war, all other forms of human endeavor shrink to insignificance.”
In the above video, Kim Kagan of the Hoover Institute makes my point:
“Unfortunately, or perhaps fortunately, it is rare for human beings to have the knowledge and have the experience in making these kinds of decisions, in organizing for these kinds of fights outside of the very moment of crisis in which their intuition, their judgement and their decisions are actually required.”
At that moment of crisis, a leader whose responsibility it is to make this decision has to have a kitbag, a pool of knowledge and experience from which to draw that enables them to make a sound and thoughtful decision.
If one ignores all of past human experience, the chances that decision will be a good one plummets. Leaders are required to think. It is in the job description.
In 2005, I was serving my second tour in Iraq. My official job title was Chief of Military Intelligence, Division Effects for the Multi-National Division, Baghdad. What that job entailed, day-to-day I’ll save for other posts. But suffice to say, I was a field grade intelligence officer working for the 3rd Infantry Division headquarters.
I distinctly remember a fellow intelligence officer stating that conducting predictive analysis on an insurgency is impossible. I strongly disagreed then and strongly disagree with that notion today, twenty years later.
There have been many, many insurgencies throughout history, as far back as the Romans and even before. More modern examples are the Spanish against Napoleon, the Communists in Cuba, Vietnam and across Central America and of course the Muhajadeen against the Russians and the Taliban against US forces in Afghanistan.
There are lessons to be learned from all of these, both in counter-insurgency operations as well as how to conduct an insurgency. In the study of these, a military intelligence officer could gleam how to do predictive analysis in a counter-insurgency.
How does that relate to you?
A leader has to think, not just react and not just run on emotion. What other traits does a good leader exhibit? Consider the following:
- A leader inspires and influences others to achieve a common goal.
- They demonstrate competence and confidence in their abilities.
- Leaders communicate effectively and foster teamwork.
- They embody the values of loyalty, duty, respect, selfless service, honor, integrity, and personal courage.
- Leaders are responsible for the development and welfare of their subordinates.
- They adapt to changing situations and make sound decisions under pressure.
A study of military history, and history in general is rife with examples of leadership, good and bad. When faced with any type of situation, a thinking leader will ask themselves these questions. “Who has faced this type of situation before? How did it turn out? What did they do right and what went wrong?” Most importantly, “what can I learn from their experience and how does it apply to the situation I’m facing now?”
Again, there’s nothing new under the sun. A delaying action against a numerically superior enemy? How about the Battle of Thermopylae, fought in 480 BC between the Spartans and the Persians.
Planning a deception campaign? Consider Operation Fortitude executed to deceive the Germans before the invasion of Europe in World War II.
Are you trying to gather intelligence and information on the opposition? Consider the Culper Spy Ring that George Washington employed during the War for Independence.
I’ll cover more on espionage with Security, in our ongoing discussion of The Principles of War.
The point is, whatever the situation someone has done it before you. Becoming a student of history will help embed these lessons in your kitbag to the point where you can make timely and sound decisions under pressure.
I wouldn’t expect that you’re planning to invade Western Europe, but a study of Operation Fortitude will provide examples of misdirection, false communications, allowing the opposition to see exactly what they expect to see, and it is exactly what you want to tell them.
Here is a real world example of using past lessons to shape current operations. When I was a young lieutenant in Germany, I was the tank platoon leader cross-attached to the mechanized infantry company.
During maneuver training at the Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTC) at Hoenfels, we were preparing our defenses against the mechanized “enemy” of the opposing forces.
My company commander wanted to install a series of minefields in the enemy’s expected avenue of approach. The problem was, we didn’t have that many mines and we didn’t have that much time.
The one thing we did have plenty of was Engineer Tape. If you’re not familiar with it, engineer tape is a textile non-adhesive tape that comes in big rolls. It is handy-dandy in the field for like a million uses.
Realizing that we couldn’t construct all of the minefields that we wanted, my company commander only put in one. We took all of our landmines and put them in the first minefield closest to the enemy.
Once all the mines were in place, we made a very visible box around the field with engineer tape. There was no way the enemy weren’t going to see it. A very obvious box that was filled with landmines any one of which would at least disable their tanks.
Then, on key locations along the enemy’s avenue of advance, we put up other big rectangles of engineer tape. These “boxes” contained no mines. All of these looked exactly like the first minefield, but were completely empty and harmless. This employed the principle of war, Economy of Force.
Our ploy worked like a charm. The enemy encountered the minefield and their lead vehicle hit a mine. The rest of their formation was stopped in their tracks until the minefield was breached and the mines disarmed. At each of the subsequent empty “minefields” the enemy stopped again to disarm mines that weren’t there.
It wasn’t long before in their attack the enemy was maneuvering around the engineer tape. They stopped trying to disarm the mines but instead just drove around them. We dictated the movements of the entire enemy attack with a few rolls of engineer tape.
In the meantime, we pummeled them with artillery and mortar fire and when they got in range, with precision tank fire from our M1A1s and Bradley fighting vehicles. The fake minefields enabled us to mass our firepower at the appropriate place where we told the enemy to go.
Fast forward to 2005, now in Baghdad, Iraq. The Green Zone was getting mortared on a pretty regular basis from an area thick with a palm tree forest a bit to the west. We were trying to track down and destroy the mortar teams.
I remembered the minefield story from 10 years prior. In the same way the fake minefields dictated the movements of the enemy, we can use the same lesson to dictate the movements of the mortar team.
Instead of engineer tape, we were going to use teams of Bradley Fighting Vehicles. By putting two Bradleys in various locations around where the mortar team operated, we knew they wouldn’t go there. Instead, they would go to the quiet out of the way place where there were no American soldiers. Or so they thought.
At the quiet out of the way place, we would have ambush teams waiting for them. Zip, surprise, gone.
I don’t know if I would have had this idea if it were not for the lesson I learned from that ingenious and creative company commander ten years prior. Completely different situation. A conventional mechanized attack against a prepared defense of tanks, artillery and infantry versus an unconventional insurgency mortar teams shooting into the Green Zone in Iraq.
Unfortunately, I can’t remember the company commander of C Company, 2-15 Infantry that my tank platoon was attached to, but I do remember the conversation we had during the After Action Review (AAR). He confessed that he didn’t make up the fake minefield trick. He learned it from someone else who learned it from somewhere else before that. Ten years later, I used it in Iraq and I didn’t make it up either.
The point is, it works. Learn. Study. Become a student of history. Put those lessons in your cranium for future use. A leader makes competent, informed and sound decisions.
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